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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED RULE 26(a). 
Defendants offer a narrow, rigid definition of the phrase "computation of 
damages" to justify the Trial Court's incorrect interpretation of Rule 26(a)(l)(C). 
Defendants assert that these words can only mean "a definite, concrete number" or a 
"damages figure." See Appellee's Brief at 13, 14 and 17. 
But such a narrow interpretation cannot be reconciled with the definition of 
"computation," which has numerous meanings such as the act or action of computing or a 
system of reckoning (see www.merriam-,:vebster.com/dictionarv/computation (last visited 
May 7, 2016)) or an act, process, or method of computing (see 
www.dictionarv.com/browse/computation (lasted visited May 7, 2016)). One possible 
definition of "computation" is also, as Defendants point out, "an amount computed." Id. 
But that is not the only or even the preferred definition. 
Defendants offer no caselaw holding that only a "concrete number" satisfies the 
Rule 26 disclosure obligation. And the case Defendants rely primarily upon - Design 
Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284 (2nd Cir. 2006)- is factually distinguishable and 
undercuts Defendants' narrow interpretation. In that case, the plaintiff provided generic 
and vague damage disclosures, including a claim for "all profits earned by the Defendants 
as a result of unlawful diversion of business from the Plaintiff to the Defendants .... " Id. 
at 291-292. The plaintiff answered an interrogatory regarding damages with similar 
1 
language. Id. In the final pre-trial order, plaintiff disclosed two witnesses - one whom 
was identified as an expert - to testify regarding lost profits. Defendants moved to 
preclude these witnesses from testifying and to exclude any other evidence of lost profits. 
Id. The plaintiff argued that they had "turned over evidence from which a computation of 
damages could be made - Plaintiffs financial records. When pressed, [plaintiff] argued 
that it was not obligated to provide a calculation of damages because the calculation of 
damages from these records would be simple arithmetic - if our revenue is $100 and our 
expenses are $50, then we have a 50% profit margin, and that is the basis on which I 
would have our people testify." Id. at 293. 
Design Strategy is thus distinguishable from the present case in that the plaintiff 
there never disclosed its lost profit percentage to defendants (i.e., the plaintiff never 
disclosed the percentage of the relevant revenue to which plaintiff believed it was 
entitled). Instead, the plaintiff provided a vague general description and a broad 
collection of financial documents, neither of which allowed the defendant to identify the 
extent and nature of the alleged damages. Nor did the District Court (or the Second 
Circuit) ever state that a "computation of damages" requires the disclosure of a "concrete 
number," and the District Court's language (as affirmed) conflicts with Defendants' 
narrow interpretation offered here. For example, the District Court stated to plaintiffs 
counsel that "it is not as simple as simply providing the [ financial statements] to the 
defendant without your providing as well a specific formula indicating how your theory 
of damages is supported. That is not something that the defendant is in a position to do." 
2 
Id. (emphasis added). The District Court's written order further stated that "[plaintiff] 
has not provided any justification for its failure to disclose information regarding the 
amount of, or the basis for computing, its alleged lost profits. Id. at 294. (emphasis 
added). Again, here, Williams was clear regarding the details of his "theory of damages" 
and his "basis for computing" the amounts due as a result of Defendants' wrongful acts. 
And unlike the defendant in Design Strategy, Defendants here knew all the relevant and 
necessary information at all times. 1 
Other cases cited by Defendants undercut their argument as well. Defendants rely 
upon Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App. 62, for the proposition 
that "bare, formulaic disclosure" cannot be cured by the defendant's ability to do "its own 
math." See Appellee's Brief at 23. The facts in Sleepy Holdings are very different than 
the facts presented here. In that case, the plaintiffs initial disclosures simply stated that 
"damages are described in the complaint" and that "additional work will be done in 
assessing and computing such damages." Id. at~ 3. A year after the fact discovery cutoff, 
1 Defendants' truncated quotation implying that the District Court (and subsequently the 
Second Circuit) found a simple arithmetic calculation as "wholly inadequate as a measure 
of damages" in relation to the phrase "computation of damages" is inaccurate. See 
Appellee' s Brief at 17. The full quote demonstrates that the District Court was discussing 
the validity of the measure of damages asserted: "The need for computation and 
supporting documents is especially necessary in a case like this, where the damage claim 
is for lost profits from a project of a type with which the plaintiff had little-to-no prior 
experience. Design's 'simple arithmetic' calculation is wholly inadequate as a measure of 
damages, given that it is undisputed that, in order to perform on the project, Design 
would have had to establish an entirely new computer lab and hire all new personnel in 
the space of two weeks." The District Court was pointing out that Design's normal net 
profit percentage would not suffice for new, different types of work. No such 
complexities are present in the case before this Court. 
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the plaintiff submitted a supplemental disclosure in which it "presented damages theories, 
including what it called the lost $2 million sale." Id. at ,i 4. Thus, unlike Williams, the 
plaintiffs in Sleepy Holdings never presented a computation of damages or a damages 
theory whatsoever, and had not identify their belief that they were entitled to the lost 
profits from the sale of certain land. 
Importantly, in discussing the phrase "computation of damages," this Court 
nowhere stated that a "concrete figure" is required. Rather, the Court stated that "[e]ven 
if a plaintiff cannot complete its computation of damages before future events takes 
place, 'the fact of damages ... and the method for calculating the amount of damages' 
must be apparent in initial disclosures." Id. at ,i 14 quoting Steven-Henager Coll. v. Eagle 
Gate Coll., 2011 UT App. 37, ,i 16. (emphasis added). The Court further stated that 
''while [plaintiffs] complaint describes the $2 million sale, it does not identify the failed 
sale as damages or offer a computation or method of calculating the damages as required 
by law. "Id. ( emphasis added). In contrast, Williams was presented with a situation in 
which the sale price of Fix-A-Phone was identified as $200,000.00 to be paid over 24 
months ( ending in early 2015), as well as certain ongoing "profit sharing." Williams 
promptly and properly identified a "method of calculating" his damages as required by 
Rule26.2 
2 Defendants also rely upon Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, another case with 
dramatically different facts. In that case, the plaintiff disclosed three new damages 
theories ''three weeks after fact discovery had closed ... " Id. at ,I 37. Notably, however, 
plaintiffs initial disclosures stated that "its damages 'constitute the funds advanced, 
together with interest at the legal rate, less the payment received from MSF."' Neither 
4 
t.. ~ 
Indeed, there are numerous disputes in which a computation of damages would not 
necessarily contain a "concrete number." For example, a company's lawsuit against a 
former employer and her new company might seek lost profits for customers successfully 
and improperly solicited by the former employer. The Rule 26 disclosures in that case 
should provide detail as to the former employer's net profit percentage on the customers 
at issue (and produce the relevant documentation to support that computation), but the 
final amount of sales by the former employer and her new company might not be defined 
until trial and therefore a "concrete number" could not (and need not) be included in the 
Rule 26 disclosures. Likewise, a similar situation could also occur as a result of a 
landlord's lawsuit caused by a former tenant's breach. If the former tenant was paying 
$10,000.00 per month and the landlord's disclosures identified that the damages suffered 
were $10,000.00 per month until the former tenant's lease expired, subject to an offset for 
rents obtained from new tenants during the term of the former tenant's lease, there would 
be little doubt that the "nature and extent" of plaintiffs damages were fully disclosed. In 
such cases, as Professor Moore stated, the defendants would plainly have an "adequate 
basis to evaluate the injury the disclosing party has suffered." Moore's Federal Practice 
3d, § 26.22[4][c][ii]. 
Defendants argue that the language of Rule 26 should be interpreted "in light of 
the purpose" that rule is "meant to achieve." See Appellee's Brief at 13 citing Biddle v. 
Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ~ 14. Williams agrees. The purposes of the Rule 26 
the trial court nor the Supreme Court criticized this "computation of damages" as not 
providing a "concrete number." 
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damages disclosure is three-fold: (1) to "accelerate the exchange of basic information" 
without the need of a formal discovery request; (2) to prevent a party from "being 
unfairly surprised by the presentation of new evidence;" and (3) to understand the 
proportionality of the case. See Appellant's Brief at 11 and the cases cited therein. These 
goals are reinforced in the 2011 Utah Advisory Notes stating that information about 
damages should be provided "early in the case" and the rules should be enforced to 
prevent "sandbagging." 
Williams acted in accordance with these goals at all times. He immediately 
disclosed his belief that he was "entitled to 30% of the price Tricked Out Services, Inc. 
paid for Fix-A-Phone, LLC as well as 30% of any equity or ownership interest 
Defendants may have in Tricked Out Services, Inc .... " (R. 485). In doing so, Williams 
provided discrete, immediate information about the "nature and extent" of his claims. He 
did so without a discovery request pending, and his description plainly allowed the 
parties to identify the relevant evidence - that is, what did Tricked Out Services Inc. 
actually pay for Fix-A-Phone under the Asset Purchase Agreement and, as part of that 
transaction, did Tricked Out provide Defendants with an equity interest. And while this 
information was unknown to Williams at the time his complaint was filed, Defendants 
were aware that the sale price was $200,000.00 (to be paid over 24 months) and that they 
received no equity in Tricked Out. Once these facts were disclosed to Williams, the 
parties addressed and prepared this case in a proportional manner, as discussed in more 
6 
detail below. Williams in no way engaged in any "sandbagging" and in no way were 
Defendants surprised by the presentation of any new evidence. 
II. DEFENDANTS' RED HERRINGS SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Defendants offered the Trial Court, and now this Court, numerous red herrings to 
avoid the technical nature of its argument and to justify their narrow, improper 
interpretation of Rule 26. Each are addressed below and should be rejected. 
Defendants assert that although Williams disclosed his entitlement to 30% of the 
"price paid" for Fix-A-Phone, Defendants were left to guess regarding how much 
Williams thought Defendant actually received for Fix-A-Phone. But Defendants 
admitted at oral argument that they knew "even at the time of the complaint that the 
company sold for $200,000" and that Williams had identified this amount in his 
deposition. (R. 929). Defendants then argued that perhaps Williams might be claiming 
that there was "some sort of collusion the - and that the purchase price was depressed." 
(R. 953-955). But when pressed at oral argument, Defendants admitted that Williams had 
never raised such an issued. And indeed, there is no ambiguity in Williams' disclosure 
on this point- he is seeking 30% of the "price Tricked Out Services, Inc. paid" for Fix-
A-Phone - not some unknown hypothetical higher purchase price (that would be 
unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and on which Williams would have no 
foundation to testify in any event). Williams never argued for anything else, 
notwithstanding Defendants' creation of imaginary damages scenarios never raised. 
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Defendants also argue that this case was originally designated as Tier Three due to 
Williams' incorrect initial belief that Fix-A-Phone was sold for $1.5 million. But once 
the sales agreement was produced in discovery, the parties treated and prepared this case 
in a proportional matter. As referenced in Williams' opening brief, only three 
depositions were taken and a few sets of written discovery exchanged. See Williams' 
Brief at 5. Two half-day depositions were taken by Williams and one half-day deposition 
was taken by Defendants. No party came anywhere close to using the 15 hours of 
deposition testimony per side authorized by Tier Two, much less the 30 hours of 
deposition testimony per side allowed by Tier Three. Defendants cannot and do not 
dispute this point. Indeed, Defendants counsel admitted during oral argument that "I 
understand the notion that discovery has been minimal, at least in writing and in 
depositions ... " (R.868). 
The facts that Defendants hired one expert witness ( on liability, not damages (R. 
861)) and that a three day trial was scheduled ( out of an abundance of caution since a jury 
was involved and even though the parties were hopeful to be finished in two days (R. 
869)) does not mean that the parties prepared the case as if $500,000.00 was at issue. 
Rather, as reflected in Williams' deposition testimony, Defendants knew all along that 
Williams believed Fix-A-Phone was sold for $200,000.00 as set forth in the undisputed 
evidence on the issue-the Asset Purchase Agreement-and not $1.5 million. And 
nowhere can Defendants point to any part of the record whatsoever where a $500,000.00 
damages number was advocated after the production of the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
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Defendants also incorrectly assert that Williams was never willing to "limit his 
damages to 30% of Fix-A-Phone's sale price." See Appellee's Brief at 7. In support of 
this position, Defendants rely upon a January 2014 email exchange between counsel 
(prior to an April 2014 mediation) and testimony from Williams' deposition in June 
2014. Both events occurred, as Defendants recognize, before Defendants had fully 
responded to Williams' discovery requests (as the Trial Court's assistance was needed in 
obtaining compliance (R.368-370)) or Defendants were deposed in December 2014. 
(R.380-382). As this discovery was conducted, the evidence established that the 
$200,000.00 sale price was the total amount paid to Defendants. That is, Williams 
confirmed that there were no other payments from Tricked Out to Defendants.3 
Defendants' reliance upon statements made in the middle of discovery presents an 
incorrect picture to this Court (as it did to the Trial Court). 
In fact, Williams always maintained that he is entitled to 30% of '"the price 
Tricked Out Services, Inc. paid for Fix-A-Phone as well as 30% of any equity or 
ownership interest Defendants may have in Tricked Out Services, including any money 
owed by Tricked Out Services, Inc." (R. 475). The Asset Purchase Agreement set forth 
the "Purchase Price" in two parts. (R. 538-539). Section 2.01 stated that there would be a 
$200,000.00 purchase price paid over 24 months, with the final payment due in January 
2015. Section 2.02 discussed an "incremental revenue share" setting forth payments to 
3 Williams eventually learned, just days before the motion in limine hearing, that such 
testimony turned out to be incorrect - as $30,000.00 in payments under Section 2.02 had 
in fact been made in early 2015. Defendants failed to promptly supplement their 
discovery responses on this point. (R. 861). 
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Defendants for certain "cell phone repair services." (R. 538-539). As Williams testified 
at his deposition in July 2014, he had read in the Asset Purchase Agreement that the 
company had been sold to Defendants for $200,000.00 under Section 2.01. What 
Williams did not know at the time, and did not learn until later, was that there were no 
payments to Defendants under Section 2.02. 
Thus, as Williams pointed out in his opposition to the motion in limine, 
"Defendants have testified that they received no ownership interest in Tricked Out 
Services, Inc. as a result of the sale and there were no assets or cash kept in Fix-A-Phone 
LLC after the sale. Assuming Defendants testimony remain consistent on this point then 
there are no damages for these items." (R. 509). Williams was left to pursue the 
$200,000.00 referenced in the Asset Purchase Agreement, which Defendants signed and 
Williams testified about in June 2014. Williams did not "hedge" regarding his damages 
theory or "contest" his own damages theory. See Appellee' s Brief at 21. His damages 
analysis was known and consistent. He was entitled to 30% of the $200,000.00 total sale ~ 
price per Section 2.01, as no other payments had been made according to Defendants. 
III. EVEN IF WILLIAMS' "COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES" DID NOT 
TECHNICALLY COMPLY WITH RULE 26(a), SUCH A FAILURE WAS 
HARMLESS. 
Defendants provide no specifics regarding how they would have been prejudiced 
by proceeding to trial even if Williams had in fact failed to properly supplement his 
initial disclosures. And the cases cited by Defendants reinforce the fact that no prejudice 
existed here. 
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Defendants cite to Bodell Constr. Co. for the principal that new damages theories 
can be prejudicial because defendants "are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut 
those theories." See Appellee's Brief at 26, n. 11. But here Defendants needed no 
additional fact discovery to "rebut" any new theories as Williams advocated no new 
theories. Defendants therefore failed to identify any additional necessary fact discovery, 
most likely because all the relevant information had always been in Defendants' 
possession. Other cases cited by Defendants - for example, Lippman v. Coldwell Banker 
Residential Brokerage Co., 2010 UT App 89, ,r 3 - stand for the proposition that late 
disclosures can be prejudicial because they delay trial. See Appellee's Brief at 26. But 
Defendants have never explained why any delay would be necessary here, and 
Defendants' never asked the Trial Court to delay trial. 
Defendants therefore offer arguments that fail to address the fundamental issue of 
whether any technical breach of Rule 26 was "harmless." Defendants likewise fail to 
address the factors identified by the Tenth Circuit as relevant to this issue. Defendants 
instead argue that the "District Court correctly noted that it was Williams' job to disclose 
his damages calculation." See Appellee's Brief at 27. This argument, in essence, can be 
reduced to the assertion that any rule violation causes prejudice in some way and 
therefore is not harmless. Utah law has never supported such a broad view of 
"prejudice," or such a narrow definition of "harmless," and Defendants cite to no caselaw 
in support of this proposition. Nor is Defendants' argument consistent with the text of 
11 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26( d)( 4 ), which recongizes that some failures to supplement timely can in 
fact be "harmless." 
Defendants are thus left to argue again that they were prejudiced because they 
over-prepared the case based on the Tier Three designation. But such a statement is 
neither true nor supported by the record. As addressed above, Defendants took one half-
day deposition. A few sets of discovery were exchanged and subpoenas for documents 
were sent to third parties. (R. 141-158, 167-181, 163-164, 199-200, 318-319, 322,328, 
333-334, 380-382). Nor did the Trial Court take evidence on whether Defendants had in 
fact "over-prepared" based on the Tier Three designation. Instead, the trial court simply 
accepted Defendants' unsupported and inaccurate statement that "they defended this 
lawsuit as if it were a $450,000.00 case" (R. 696) even through Defendants' counsel 
admitted that he "understood the notion that discovery has been minimal." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants assertion that it was "forced to wade through years of discovery" 
wondering the whole time whether "they were facing a suit for millions of dollars" (see 
Appellee's Brief at 30) simply cannot be squared with the facts of this case. The truth is 
much more simple. 
Williams asserted that he was entitled to 30% of the sales price of Fix-A-Phone. 
He never asserted that price was deflated, inflated, or in some way improper. He never 
asserted that he was entitled to other funds not provided to Defendants as part of the sale 
price. Defendants knew the entire time that the sale price was $200,000.00 to be paid 
12 
over 24 months and, once Williams learned that fact, the parties proceed forward with 
reasonable and proportional discovery, taking (in Defendants' words) "minimal 
discovery." Williams hid nothing and was not sandbagging anyone. His computation of 
damages was clear, unequivocal, and certainly provided Defendants with notice of the 
"nature and extent" of the claimed damages. Only by ignoring every single piece of 
written and testimony evidence in the case, including Williams testimony that he 
understood the company had sold for $200,000.00, could Defendants possibly believe 
that they were "facing a suit worth millions of dollars." 
Williams' initial disclosure thus properly set forth a "computation" of his 
requested damages. As a result, the Trial Court's ruling that a "claim of a fixed 
percentage of damages does not comply with the requirement to disclose a calculation of 
damages ... " is erroneous and should be overturned by this Court. For the reasons set 
forth above, Williams respectfully requests that the Trial Court's order, dated October 13, 
2015, be reversed. 
DATED this 11th day of May 2016. 
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH, LLP 
/s/ Richard F. Ensor 
Richard F. Ensor 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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